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FORUM
THE POLITICAL MOTIVATION OF A m 210N DEREGULATION

William Zink
During the early stages of the US airline industry,there were no formal govement regulatory controls. "Prior to 1938,
only airmail carriers had been subject to government regulation" (Lin 3). The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 laid the
ground work for the federal regulatory policies of the airline industry which remained intact for nearly 4 decades. The
main goal of this act was to "strengthen the air transport system in this country through tight regulation and restriction
of new competitors""(Miller 4).
The 1938 Act created defined order by allowing all
established carriers to continue service on existing routes.
Further proposals concenring all new routes and competitors
had to be approved by the government. The authorization of
new routes was abased on the mandate stating that proposals
must show potential profitability, and that existing carriers
would not be placed in economic jeopardy by the plan (Miller
5). The act also classified airlines into categories which
included: 'Ynmk, local service, commuter, supplemental, or
all-cargo operators" (US Dept. of Commerce 5). Trunk
airlines were composed of the largest carriers, while local
service airlines acted as the feeders for the trunk carriers.
Commuter airlines flew small aircraft and supplemental
caniers acted as charter companies, while all-cargo operators
flewt i q h t Control and enforcement of the provisions of the
Civil Aeronautics Act was delegated to the newly formed
Civil Aeronautics Authority, '%la renamed the Civil
Aeronautics Board" (Lin 3).
The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was given the great
task to regulate an industry that had previously been fiee to
operate without constraint. The CAB was granted specific
authorities as established in the Civil Aeronautics Act which
included: "control of entry, control of exit, fare regulation,
subsidy approval, control of mergers and inter carrier
agreements, d investigation of deceptive trade practices and
unfair methods of competition" (Thomas 2).
Control of entry and exit dealt with the establishment of new
carriers and routes. Large@ focusing on entry of new
competitors, the CAB protected existing carriers by crushing
an endlessnumber of new proposals. Those who were able to
gain approval for new mutes were forced to go through a time
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consuming process of investigationsheaded by the CAB. In
the later years of regulation, the CAB stopped approving new
proposals altogether. An investigation of airline regulation in
1975 found that "out of 94 applications for trunk carrier
author@receivedsince 1950, none and succeeded" (Mder3).
Exisling caniers were not allowed to abondon routes without
authorization from the board, however, some were forced to
end service due to corporate instability. Since very few new
entrant proposals had been granted, the number of existing
carriers dwindled as mergers and exit out of the industry
occurred. This severly limited US airline growth, which later
became an important basis in the argument for deregulation.
Other key areas of CAB authority focused on fares and
subsidies. Fares for passengers were directly controlled by
the CAB, and although airlines were able to request specific
rates,the board had final authority. The "fare-level was based
on hypothetical industry costs instead of actual cost
experience" (Miller 5). This allowed fares to be unnaturally
inflated, which cost the consumer heavlly. The CAB also
controlled the payment of subsidies to airlines. The purpose
of these payments was to provide service to many of the
smaller communities in the US. The subsidieswere given to
the airlines in the form of contracts for carrying US mail
(Miuer 0).
The remaining authorities of the CAB, pertaining to intercarrier agreementsand airline trade practices, were secondary
areas of focus. Merger and inter-carrier agreement control
was largely manipulated by the board's policies of industry
entry and exit. Certain mergers were ratified in order to save
existing airlines that had become ktncially unstable. Mutual
airline agreements, once approved by the board, "were
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given immunity fiom antitrust laws" (Miller 7).
Investigation into deceptive trade practices and unfair
methods of competition dealt primarily with false advertising
and lack of airline adherence to regulated ticket prices.
Airlines tryingto bend these rules faced stiff penalties and indepth CAB investigations.
The goal of the Civil Aeronautics Board was to create strong
national airlines, and undoubtedly it did. The airline industry
was seen as an infant industry, as described by some
economists, which needed protection fiom competition in
order to develop and mature. The CAB and regulation did
indeed serve their purpose, but in the late 1960's and early
1970's the industry was becoming constrained by these
protective government policies (Thomas 4). Consumers
complained of in£latedticket prices, and small airlines were
eager to gain entry into this market. Noted economists also
remarked similar views, and soon politicians took an interest
in the issue of disbanding the CAB and pushing for airline
deregulation.
The political interest in deregulation found its basis in the
Watergate investigations of the Nixon administration
(Petzinger 78). Stephen Breyer, a lawyer on the Watergate
Special Pmsi%utions force, discovered that American Airlines
was one of the companies which had contributed funds to the
Nixon admbktntioa Breyer realized that American Airlines
must have been trying to influence someone in government
who' was possibly connected to the CAB. He also noted the
mtemting fact that Gerald Ford, the president at the time, was
trying to decrease US innation yet "the airline industry was
gouging the traveling public with higher and higher fares7'
(Petzinger 80).
During this period, Senator Edward Kennedy was looking
to run for the presidency in the upcoming election. Kennedy
realized that he would need an issue to base his campaign on.
Breyer propositioned Kennedy with his discovery, and the
senator decided to use this as his platform. The goal of the
campaign was to establish a Senate inquiry to examine
government control of the airline industry, champion
cierernon, and elimination of the CAB. Knowing that this
was going to be no easy task,Breyer enlisted the help of Phil
Bakes an associate h ncollege. Bakes was also a lawyer and
part of the Watergate Prosecution force.
The first obstacle on the path to deregulation was Senator
Howard Cannon. Cannon had a vested interest in aviation
because he was &om Nevada, a state which relies heavily
&cally

upon airlines to transport vacationing travelers. He was also
chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation, as well as
the chairman of the Rules Committee which controls the
budgets for all other Senate committees (Petzinger 81).
Clearly Kennedy's inquiry had to be sensitive to the concerns
of Senator Cannon.
The seumd major obstacle encountered by Kennedy's team
was the airlines. Nearly all of the trunk carriers opposed the
notion of deregulation. The major concerns of the airlines
were based on the intensive fear of competition and the drastic
reduction in fares brought about by low cost entrants. The
main impediment Kennedy faced relating to the airlines was
lobbyists. The airline industry had developed one of the
largest pools of lobbyist in government, who were very
influentialabout de&ions affiting airline profitability. There
was a glimpse of hope for Kennedy's efforts though. Dick
Ferris, CEO of United Airlirres, believed that United could
benelit from deregulation (Lin 6). Ferris felt that government
regulation was restricting the growth of US airlines. He
believed that deregulation was inevitable and the company
should take the lead in promoting Senator Kennedy's ideas.
Support for deregulation also came fiom within the CAB.
"Alfred Kahn of Cornell argued that the policies of the CAB
tended to raise costto the level of price" (petzinger 82). This
idea emphasized the inefficiencythat government regulation
had promoted. Monte Lazarus, a high ranking official within
the CAB, saw this inefficiency and refused to take part in the
governmentbureaucracy any longer. Lazarus decided to go to
work for United as a consultant, hoping to aid in the
deregulation process.
At thispoint, the Subcommitteeon A-ative
Practice
and Procedure began to review the findings which Kennedy's
investigation had uncovered (petzinger 84). Many issues
including inefficiency and illegal practices of the CAB were
discussed. The fact that deregulation had already begun
within the industry was brought to light. Airlines such as
Texas International were taking advantage of the CAB's
decreased control over f a policies by introducingdiscounted
fares. The subcommittee found particular interest in the
akgat~ons
of illegal practices of the CAB. It was discovered
by Bakes, of Kennedy's team, that investigations into the
CAB's umnection with the Watergate scandal were internally
covered up by members of the agency.
As the hearings progressed, Senator Kennedy's Democratic
Presidential nomination was lost to Jimmy Carter. Carter,
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later elected president, supported Kennedy's drive for airline
deregulation. It was also during this period that United
Airlines officially voiced its support of deregulation. Several
other smaller airlines (Frontier and Southwest) joined
United's stance regarding deregulation &Wer 27).
The tide turned against government control when John
Robson, then chairman of the CAB, testified before the Senate
subcamittee in favor of deregulation. This important event
changed the opinion of Senator Cannon, chairman of the
subcommittee, regarding the importance of deregulation.
Now the last hurdle for the Kennedy team had been
conquered. To fiu-ther ensure victory in their effort, Phil
Bakes got Alfred Kahn appointed chairman of the CAB as a
replacement for Robson (Miller 28). Kahn acted as a puppet
for the Kennedy team to manipulate, so as to ensure that the
deregulation legislation would not be defeated.
Bakes also used other clever techniques to convince
q e s s i o n a l supporters of government control to vote for the
Airline Daegulation Act. The act passed through the Senate
but was voted down in the House of Representatives. M e r
Senator Kennedy used his political presence in fundraising
events, as a favor to particular members of the House, the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was passed by both the
House and Senate.
The main goal of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 was
to increase competition within the airline industry. The act
goes against most pf the principles outlined in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938. The 1978 act promotes the entrance
of new carriers, as well as existing carriers into new areas.
Other areas of focus included "continued support of sewice
into small communities and the use of secondary airports as
major metropolitan areas " (Miller 11). An emphasis on air
safety had also been mandated in the act.
After the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978was passed, the
power of the CAB quickly began to diminish, and drastic
changes were made to its previously regulated authority.
Major changes in authority affected policies regarding:
control of entry, routes, fare control, modifications to subsidy
programs, and antitrust legislation. These areas of control
were gradually delegated to various governmental agencies,
and the CAB lost all control when it ceased existence on
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January 1,1985.
Protection of existing carriers was no longer the goal of the
US government. Rules for entry into the airline industry
became quite liberal after the Deregulation Act was passed.
The liberalized role of government is also seen in the area of
airlinemute control. The new route structure allowed airlines
to automatically enter into certain locations without going
through a y1bureaucraticprocess. This greatly increased
competition that could not be experienced under the
umstmiuts of the CAB. In addition, deregulation now allowed
airlines to set their own fares based on their competition,
rather than an arbitrary level. Fares were allowed to vary
according to passenger concentrations and the time of year.
Other changes in authority involved subsidies and antitrust
legislation. Subsidy regulation was drastically changed, and
control over these payments was given to the Department of
Transportation in 1985 (Miller 11). The 1978 act provided
that once a carrier decided to withdraw from a subsidized
route, the subsidy was terminated. This initially hurt smaller
destination airports which benefited from the subsidy
program, but commuter airlines quickly filled these vacant
roles. Complete control of legislation concerningmergers and
agreements was given to the Department of Justice in 1'983.
Antitrust issues have been a major concern in light of the
recent merger proposals amongst the i n d w ' s largest
established carriers.
The deregulation of the airline industry has restructured
unporate business Megies. Today's airlines are much more
efficient and cost conscious in every aspect of business
activity. Competition demands that airlines utilize all
available resources. New ideas and technologies are
developed quickly in order for companies to gain competitive
advantages over other firms. Advancements such as the use
of computer reservation systems and online ticket auctions are
pushing the industry to new limits. Under this free market
system, the possibilities are limitless for the airline
industry.0
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From time to lime those of us in aviation education receive excellent papers from our students through the routine of our classes.
Some of these are worthy of publication. Such is the case of this paper. Its author, William J. Z& an undergraduate (!) student
submitted it as a requirement for a class in aviation legislation.
The editorial board of this journal encourages aviation educators in both graduate and undergraduate aviation programs across the
county to submit deserving papers fiom their students for review and potential publication.

T. Brady, Dean of the School of Aviation, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
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